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CAUGHT IN THE TRANSITION:  
A CAUTIONARY TALE FOR SAME-SEX 




Elizabeth A. Marcuccio* 
Matina Mouyos** 
 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
 After the Supreme Court’s decision legalizing same-sex 
marriage in Obergefell v. Hodges1, one would believe that the 
disparity in the treatment of same-sex versus opposite-sex 
couples under the law would cease. Yet a series of decisions by 
New York state courts examining the rights of same-sex 
couples after the end of their relationships have had unforeseen 
consequences. These decisions have impacted the areas of 
estate planning, equitable distribution of property, and parental 
rights relating to the custody and visitation of the couple’s 
children.  
 The purpose of this article is to analyze these court 
rulings and provide guidance to avoid both unexpected and 
unintended outcomes. 
_________________________________________ 
* Professor of Business Law, Siena College, Loudonville, New 
York 
** Student, Siena College, Loudonville, New York 




II. BEQUESTS TO FORMER SPOUSES 
 New York Estates, Powers and Trusts Law (EPTL) §5-
1.4 states that, unless the will expressly states otherwise, a  
divorce, judicial separation, or annulment of a marriage 
revokes all dispositions or appointments made by a decedent to 
a former spouse. The former spouse is treated as having 
predeceased the testator. This means any bequests to the former 
spouse, the nomination of the former spouse as executor or 
trustee, and any appointments of property in the former 
spouse’s favor under a power of appointment are revoked. 
The revocation is valid even if the will was executed before  
the marriage.2 In addition, the former spouse’s rights to 
“in-trust-for” bank accounts (Totten Trusts), life insurance  
policies, lifetime revocable trusts, and joint tenancies with right
 of survivorship are also revoked.3  
 
 Matter of Leyton4 involves a petition by the decedent’s 
mother and sister to revoke letters testamentary issued to the 
decedent’s former same-sex partner naming him as executor, 
and to disqualify him as a beneficiary under the will. The 
decedent and his former partner had entered into a commitment 
ceremony in New York in 2002, but later separated in 2008. 
The will was executed on January 11, 2001, prior to the 
commitment ceremony.5 If the decedent and his partner had 
married and then divorced, EPTL §5-1.4 would have barred his 
former partner from serving as executor and from inheriting 
under the will. When the Bennett Commission first reviewed 
this issue in the 1960s, it found it counterintuitive that any 
testator would provide a gift to a former spouse, and the 
Legislature agreed.6  In their petition, the decedent’s mother 
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and sister contended that the former partner was the equivalent 
of a former spouse, and therefore should be disqualified under 
the statute. 
 
 The petitioners argued that the State of New York 
“wrongfully and unconstitutionally deprived decedent and his 
partner the right to marry and subsequently divorce.” 
Therefore, the Surrogate’s Court, “as a matter of right and 
equity” should apply the statutory provisions of EPTL §5-1.4.7 
Conversely, the former partner argued that at the time of the 
commitment ceremony, the union was not considered a formal 
marriage in New York State, and the subsequent break-up was 
not a “separation,” “abandonment” or “divorce” as defined by 
the statute.8 
 The Surrogate noted that the petitioners were asking the 
Court to retroactively apply New York’s Marriage Equity Act, 
which did not legalize same-sex marriage until 2011. The 
Court further stated that it is up to the Legislature to decide 
questions such as this, concluding, “this Court cannot deem the 
commitment ceremony to have sanctified a marriage,” thereby 
allowing the decedent and his former partner to be deemed 
divorced.”9 Even after 2011 the decedent and his former 
partner took no steps to obtain a judicial decree declaring an 
end to their union. The petition was denied.  
 While the Court’s decision appears to deny the 
presumed intent of the decedent, this may not true. The 
decedent died in December 2013 of a heart attack at the age of 
52. This was more than five years after the decedent and his 
former partner had ended their relationship. The couple had 
been together approximately 10 years prior to their 
commitment ceremony, and separated six years after the 
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ceremony, resulting in a 16-year relationship. They stayed on 
good terms after their separation; they continued to co-own 
property, bank accounts and credit cards up until the decedent’s 
death. Early in 2013, the decedent attended his former partner’s 
wedding when he married another man, and the decedent acted 
as the wedding’s sole official witness.10 
 The decedent had ample time and opportunity to 
execute a new will after the romantic relationship between the 
parties ended, but did not. While the Court’s ruling appears to 
support the decedent’s wishes in this case, the opposite may be 
true in future cases. It is imperative that same-sex couples who 
never legally marry, then later separate, review and update 
their estate plans. They cannot rely on the language of EPTL 
§5-1.4 to revoke all bequests to a former loved one. Only by 
revising their documents can they be certain that their true 
wishes will be carried out. 
  
III. EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY 
 Equitable distribution is the means by which New York 
allocates marital property between the spouses when a 
marriage ends. New York’s Domestic Relations Law provides 
that equitable distribution of marital property shall be made in 
a court action where all or part of the relief granted is a 
divorce, or upon the dissolution, annulment or declaration of 
the nullity of a void marriage.11 This provision authorizes the 
court to equitably distribute marital property only when the 
marital relationship is terminated. Absent such a change in 
marital status, the court is powerless to distribute marital 
property.  
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 The term "marital property" is defined as all property 
acquired by either or both spouses during the marriage and 
before the execution of a separation agreement or the 
commencement of a divorce action, regardless of the form in 
which title is held.12 Excluded from marital property is separate 
property, which includes property acquired before the marriage 
or property acquired by bequest, devise, descent or gift from a 
third party to one of the spouses.13 
 O’Reilly-Morshead v. O’Reilly-Morshead14 involves a 
same-sex couple who began their relationship in 2001. In 2002 
the couple moved to New York, but before relocating the 
defendant sold a house that she owned in her own name in 
Indiana. In June, 2003, the couple entered into a civil union in 
Vermont. Under the Vermont civil union statute the parties 
acquired rights, under Vermont law, in property they acquired 
thereafter.15  In 2004 the plaintiff purchased a home in New 
York, which she purchased with her separate property; the 
defendant was not listed on the deed to the property. In 2006 
the couple was married in Canada, and five years later the 
plaintiff commenced a divorce action in New York seeking 
equitable distribution of the marital property.   The defendant 
then filed an action for divorce and a counterclaim for 
dissolution of the civil union, asking the New York court to 
distribute any “civil union property” under Vermont law.16 
 At controversy is whether either or both of the parties 
attained legal rights to property acquired by the other party in 
her own name after the date of the civil union, but before the 
date of the marriage. At the time of the parties’ civil union, 
Vermont’s civil union statute granted couples entering a civil 
union the same property rights as those extended to couples 
entering a marriage.17 Nevertheless at the time these parties 
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entered into their civil union, Vermont did not recognize their 
union as a legal marriage. In 2009 Vermont passed a Marriage 
Equality Act which afforded legal status to same-sex 
marriages.18  This Act defines marriage, stating that it includes 
all "legally recognized unions of two people." Therefore 
marriages and civil unions, after the Marriage Equality Act, are 
equivalent unions that can be dissolved by the Vermont courts. 
To further clarify property rights, the Vermont Supreme Court 
has intoned that even if joined in a civil union, the property 
acquired by the parties during the civil union is subject to court 
distribution, and is referred to as the "marital estate"19 
 While it is clear that Vermont courts have the authority 
to dissolve the couples’ civil union and subsequent marriage, as 
well as distribute all property acquired by them after the date of 
their civil union, do New York courts have jurisdiction to do 
the same? Appeals courts in New York state have held that trial 
courts can dissolve civil unions under a trial court's general 
equity jurisdiction.20 Nevertheless, while authorizing New 
York courts to dissolve civil unions, no guidance was provided 
regarding the distribution of property acquired during the 
course of the civil union.21 The court in O’Reilly-Morshead had 
to decide whether it could distribute "civil union property" that 
is outside the scope of "marital property" as defined in the 
Domestic Relations Law. The mere fact that the court has the 
power to dissolve the civil union does not dictate that it must 
apply New York's statutory rules to relief under the 
dissolution.22 In that respect, it is important to note that other 
New York courts have concluded that a civil union is not the 
equivalent of a marriage in New York.23  Furthermore the Third 
Department declined to  apply comity and extend New York's 
system of benefits to a civil union partner stating, 
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While parties to a civil union may be 
spouses, and even legal spouses, in 
Vermont, New York is not required to 
extend to such parties all of the benefits 
extended to marital spouses. The 
extension of benefits entails a 
consideration of social and fiscal policy 
more appropriately left to the 
Legislature.24 
 The court in O’Reilly-Morshead ruled that there was no 
indication from the legislature or the Court of Appeals that the 
definition of marital property, which is subject to distribution 
in New York divorce actions, could be so easily relinquished to 
other states. This would cause the situs of the marriage, rather 
than that of divorce, to carry more weight, and the court 
refused to adopt Vermont’s definition of marital property or the 
marital estate.25 
    A second argument made by the defendant is that a civil 
union is an “express contract” similar to the marriage contract. 
As a matter of contract law, the union is subject to termination 
by a court of general equity, and the court must decide whether 
to utilize New York or Vermont law as the basis for developing 
a remedy after termination of the agreement. While the court 
acknowledged the persuasiveness of this argument, it declined 
to accept it, stating,  
The failure of the legislature to recognize 
"civil unions" and the strict definition of 
"marital property" as the starting point for 
considering equitable distribution of 
property prohibit this court from venturing 
to that conclusion. There is no general 
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common law of equity that is equivalent 
to the statutory creation of an equitable 
distribution power in the Domestic 
Relations Law. Equitable distribution of 
property from a titled party to a non-titled 
party is only permitted in New York if the 
parties are married, either under the laws 
of New York, or other states or nations. 
The Court of Appeals has repeatedly 
noted that a "marriage"—of whatever type 
or from whatever jurisdiction—is the only 
touchstone for equitable distribution of 
property in New York.26 
 
 The Court’s decision in this case appears to be an 
anomaly; it dissolves a preexisting civil union, but only allows 
equitable property distribution based upon the date of the 
couple’s legal marriage. Some states recognize civil unions as 
the equivalent of a legal marriage, providing the parties with 
the same legal rights and responsibilities of a married couple. 
However, this case serves as a caution to same-sex couples: 
The jurisdiction in which they entered a civil union may not 
serve as the controlling law when they wish to terminate their 
relationship. When seeking court-ordered distribution of civil 
union property, it is the law of the state granting the dissolution 
that controls. These couples, while on good terms, may wish to 
sign an express contract addressing the distribution of civil 




IV. PARENTAL RIGHTS 
 
 In New York state, it has long been presumed that a 
child born of a married woman is the child of the husband. The 
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presumption is recognized at common law27 and codified in 
New York statutes.28 Both New York’s Domestic Relations 
Law and Family Court Act establish that a child born before or 
after the marriage shall be deemed to be the legitimate child of 
the married couple. This is true whether or not the marriage 
was valid. 
 
 Kelly S. v. Farah M.29 involves a same-sex couple that 
began their relationship in March 2000. They entered into a 
registered domestic partnership in California in January 2004, 
and shortly thereafter decided to start a family. Anthony S., a 
close friend of both of the parties, agreed to donate his sperm, 
and Kelly S. became pregnant through artificial insemination. 
In January 2005, Kelly S. gave birth to I.S., who was legally 
adopted by Farah M. and is not a subject of this case.  
 
 The parties decided to have another child, and Anthony 
S. again agreed to donate his sperm. This time Farah M. 
became pregnant by artificial insemination and gave birth to 
Z.S. on March 24, 2007. The parties were legally married in 
August 2008 when California first allowed same-sex 
marriages. That same year they decided to have a third child, 
and Farah M. became pregnant once more through artificial 
insemination, with Anthony S. again donating the sperm. Farah 
M. gave birth to E.S. on April 27, 2009. Both Z.S. and E.S. 
were given Kelly S.'s surname, and Kelly S. was listed as a 
parent on the children's birth certificates. In conceiving Z.S. 
and E.S. the artificial insemination procedure was performed at 
home by Farah M., rather than by a physician, and the parties 
did not draft or sign a written consent agreement. Kelly S. did 
not legally adopt Z.S. or E.S.30    
 
 In 2012 the parties relocated with the children to New 
York. Subsequently the parties separated, and Kelly S. moved 
to Arizona in the summer of 2013, while Farah M. remained in 
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New York with the three children. In May 2014 Kelly S. filed a 
visitation petition in the Family Court in Suffolk County, New 
York, seeking visitation with Z.S. and E.S. The petition alleged 
that Kelly S. was the mother of the subject children and stated 
the facts set forth above. The petition further alleged that Kelly 
S. helped raise the children until the parties separated.31 In 
determining parentage the first issue that the court had to 
decide was whether to use New York or California law. After 
discussing the doctrine of comity,32 the court determined that 
the parties' decade long history and residence in California 
warranted the application of California law to this matter.   
 
 Turning to the facts of this case, the court noted that the 
parties did not comply with the artificial insemination laws of 
either California or New York. Therefore, those statutes did not 
provide a basis for treating Kelly S. as a parent. Nevertheless, 
after analyzing the presumption of parentage arising under 
California law for children born of a marriage,33 as well as the 
California law for registered domestic partnerships,34 the court 
determined that when Z.S. was born in 2007, while the parties 
were living together in a registered domestic partnership, 
California law afforded them the same rights and obligations 
with respect to Z.S. as if they were married spouses. The court 
concluded that Kelly S. was presumed to be the parent of both 
Z.S. and E.S. under California law.35  
 
 At first glance this case appears to create new law in 
New York, doing away with New York’s previous holding in 
Matter of Paczkowski v. Paczkowski,36 which concluded a non-
biological mother does not have standing to seek custody or 
visitation.  In Paczkowski the court held that the presumption of 
parentage does not arise for the non-gestational spouse in a 
same-sex marriage because there is no possibility that she is the 
child’s biological parent. While it may be an indication of 
intent to be a parent, as would a non-biological parent’s name 
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on a birth certificate, it does not create a legal parent-child 
relationship. 
  
 While it is true that many states have a “martial 
presumption of parentage,” it is applied differently by the 
states. In New York, the marital presumption of parentage does 
not apply to same-sex couples. Therefore, had Kelly S. and 
Farah M. lived in New York, and conceived and given birth to 
their children in New York, the outcome of this case would 
have been vastly different. Kelly S. would have been denied 
visitation to the children she had helped to raise since their 
birth. Same-sex families be cautioned: Adoption is the only 
way to create a legal parent-child relationship that must be 
recognized in every state. 
 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
 Marriage is a vital package of legal rights and 
responsibilities. Prior to our nation legalizing same-sex 
marriage, many states permitted same-sex couples to take part 
in commitment ceremonies or enter civil unions or registered 
domestic partnerships. These “marriage substitutes” do not 
afford the parties the same rights and responsibilities of a legal 
marriage, and may result in unforeseen consequences when a 
couple seeks to dissolve their relationship. It is time for states 
to pass legislation to mitigate these unexpected and unintended 
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